Friday, May 26, 2017
Two quick links
1) From Quillette, an article arguing that the difference between Eastern and Western Europe on the issue of Muslims refugees is that Eastern Europeans have been the conquered rather than the conquerors. I personally support taking in refugees, but I think the mindset of those who disagree is worth understanding rather than dismissing. However, I think the biggest error in this piece is exaggerating Western European openness to refugees.
2) Timothy Burke uses the example of Donald Trump to dispute Jonathan Haidt's claim that liberals don't have a sense of sacred vs. profane. Burke argues that liberals simply hold sacred very different things than what conservatives hold sacred. Here I strongly agree with Burke. Liberalism has plenty of religious aspects.
Sunday, April 24, 2016
Ethical knowledge is not ethical action
I'm blogging about this because Steele is a famous psychologist, best known outside the field for his work on stereotype threat. I do not know enough about the details of those cases and the chain of events inside the administration to say for certain whether Steele deserves criticism, but the issue here is less about specific individual culpability and burdens, and more about assumptions that are "in the air" among academics. Regardless of whether Steele himself made mistakes of sufficient gravity to merit losing his job according to whatever standard you might wish to apply, it seems clear that things could have been handled better than they were. What matters here is that the handling was, at the least, sub-optimal, sitting somewhere along a spectrum that goes from "grossly negligent" to "typical bureaucratic response" to "probably well-intentioned but still not what we need."
In the modern zeitgeist there is a belief that raising awareness of research on bias--including but not limited to subconscious bias--will lead to better behavior, better decision-making, more sensitive people, etc. Now, to my knowledge Steele himself does not explicitly study sexual harassment, but he does study stereotypes and their effects. One can reasonably guess that he is thus more aware than the average academic about the wider literature on bias, sexism, etc. If a raised consciousness were the key to getting people to respond promptly, appropriately, and effectively to acts of sexism, racism, etc. then putting a bias researcher into a position of power would be the surest path to reform. Alas, it seems that bias researchers are as human as anyone else. Having lots of "is" knowledge about how bias works does not lead them to act as they "ought" when faced with a professional challenge.
This should not be a surprise. Jonathan Haidt noted in The Righteous Mind that academics who study ethics are no more ethical than anyone else. I'm from a family full of health professionals, and some of them have all sorts of unhealthy habits. I'm in a profession of educated people and some of them are anti-intellectual.
There's a separation between what we know intellectually and what we carry into practice. That's certainly an indictment of my profession, including the traditionalists and the progressives alike, because studying something, even in-depth and for years, doesn't always transform people as you'd hope. At the same time, I'd like to selfishly and shamelessly argue that it reflects even worse on the progressives than the traditionalists, because I think the traditionalists are more willing to treat problems as hard, whereas the progressives hold out hope for secret tricks and correct politics. A traditionalist social scientist wants to understand people, while a reformer wants to fix them. It's the difference between science and engineering. Most news articles about "According to a new study..." (including the one I linked to at the beginning of this post) are written to satisfy a curiosity about how to act, not merely to help the reader understand why people act as they do.
So, I don't claim to know anything about how things were handled (or mishandled) behind the scenes at Berkeley, but at the very least I am unsurprised that a bias researcher would not be any better than the rest of the world when it comes to responding to sexism. All of the "is" statements in the world cannot change a person's "oughts." Only "ought" statements can do that. Social scientists cannot save us any more than priests can. Only you can save your soul. Priests and social scientists can advise you, but only you can decide your actions.
Saturday, April 2, 2016
Haidt, final chapter
I haven't had a lot to say about Haidt's book because most of it hasn't touched on the themes that I want to explore in this blog. I will just touch on two things from the last chapter:
1) Empirical work has shown that liberals have more misconceptions about conservatives than conservatives have about liberals. This might sound suspicious, if you only think about the most fire-breathing conservative pundits that you have seen, but the world is mostly made up of normal people, not fire-breathing pundits. He spends much of the book explaining the differences between the moral intuitions of the left and right, and shows that the left has a small set of eminently rational moral intuitions, while the right has basically the same intuitions but also supplements them with some notions that you either find defensible or don't find defensible. Consequently, conservatives can (on average) liberals better than liberals can understand conservatives.
I am so, so, SOOOO tempted to extrapolate this to things that I observe in the faculty lounge, but I think that social class and a rather unusual set of professional experiences do more to explain the clueless attitudes of academics than their partisan biases. That isn't to say that Haidt's findings on political psychology aren't relevant (I'm sure they are) but I doubt they're the only factor.
2) On page 336, Haidt makes a great comment about teaching: When he decided to start doing research on political psychology, he decided that the only way to learn the subject was to teach a class on it. So true. So, so true.
Tuesday, March 29, 2016
Haidt, page 153
Tuesday, March 22, 2016
Haidt, Chapter 3
Haidt, chapters 1 and 2
I find this to be useful outside of the moral domain, in terms of understanding persuasion. Too often at work people want to treat the layers above us as some sort of deterministic machine, and they're looking for the consistency so that they can reliably turn the lever and get what they want. But people don't work that way. They have their hot buttons, their emotions, and then also their cooler, calmer side. Different things come into play at different times, and you have to gauge all of those before you can successfully engage in persuasion.